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High School Athletics and Due Process:
Notice of Eligibility Rules
Teare v. Board of Education, No. CV77-L-190 (D. Neb.
Sept. 16, 1977); Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities
Association, No. CV77-L-192 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
Teare v. Board of Education1 and Compagno v. Nebraska
School Activities Association2, decisions issued by Chief Judge
Urbom in the United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska, should be of interest to every attorney and school
official associated with high school athletics. These companion
cases involve the related issues of whether participation in high
school athletics is an interest protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and, if so, whether the
notice of eligibility rules provided in each instance satisfied the
requirements of that constitutional protection.
3
Teare and Compagno are significant for several reasons.
They extended due process protection to a single specific seg-
ment of the total educational program which is generally pro-
vided in a secondary school. The discussions of the factors
which should be considered and the standards which should be
applied in determining what process is due provide excellent
guidance for school officials. Furthermore, these cases illus-
trate an application of due process considerations relative to the
access to as contrasted with the removal from an educational
program or activity.
1. No. CV77-L-190 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 1977) (memorandum and order denying
preliminary injunction).
2. No. CV77-L-192 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 1977) (memorandum and order denying
preliminary injunction).
3. Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192 (D. Neb.
Sept. 16, 1977), also involved claims of violations of equal protection and
the right to travel; however, these allegations of constitutional violations
were rejected by the court with only a brief discussion, and the specific
resolutions of these claims are not discussed in this casenote.
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II. FACTS
John Teare and Vincent Compagno, the plaintiffs in the sep-
arate actions, were ruled ineligible to participate on the varsity
football teams of their respective schools at the beginning of the
1977 season. The rules under which the two students were deter-
mined to be ineligible were established and promulgated by the
Nebraska School Activities Association,4 of which each school
was a member. The Association was the defendant of record in
Compagno and an intervening defendant in Teare.
5
The facts of Teare established that John Teare moved with
his family to Grand Island, Nebraska, prior to the beginning of
the 1975-76 school term, which was his sophomore year. Upon
entering Grand Island High School, he was provided orientation
material which included a student handbook. A revised hand-
book was reissued to all students at the beginning of the 1976-77
school year.6
Both versions of the handbook contained an entry under the
heading "Athletics" in substantially the following language:
Grand Island Senior High School is a member of the Nebraska
High School Activities Association. A student who participates in any
inter-school contest (athletics, music, speech, etc.) must conform to the
eligibility requirements of this- association. The school has additional
requirements which must be observed. The requirements for partici-
pation are as follows: (1) Good citizenship. (2) Passing in at least 15
hours of work each semester.
7
Also included in the handbook was rule 1(b) of the by-laws of
the Nebraska School Activities Association which provides:
A student shall have credit on the school records for fifteen semester
hours of school work for the immediate preceding semester. The term
"preceding semester" means the semester immediately preceding the
semester in which the student wishes to participate in.athletics.
8
4. The Nebraska School Activities Association is a voluntary organization of
Nebraska schools, which has the purpose of promoting and regulating the
competition between schools in extracurricular activities. The program of
activities for Nebraska schools is recommended by the State Board of
Education, but the rules and regulations governing interscholastic compet-
ition are made by the members of the Association. NEBRASKA SCHOOL
ACTIVITIES ASS'N, FORTY-THIRD ANNUAL YEARBOOK (1977-1978).
5. It has been established that for purposes of such litigation state school
activities associations act under color of state law and are subject to suit.
Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 501 F.2d 25,28 (8th Cir. 1974); Brenden
v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1973); Mitchell
v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155, 1157 (5th Cir. 1970).
6. Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 2.
7. Id.
8. NEBRASKA SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASS'N, supra note 4, at 15. See Teare v.
Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 2.
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Teare neither acknowledged nor denied receipt of the second
handbook. He did testify that upon receiving the 1975-76 hand-
book he had read a section on athletic letter requirements, but
that he had not read the eligibility provision and was unaware
of the preceding-semester rule. He did admit knowing that ath-
letic participation was conditioned on some rule relating to
academic standing.9
During the second semester of his junior year, Teare failed
two courses and did not earn fifteen hours credit. He was there-
fore ineligible under the preceding-semester rule to participate
in athletics during the fall semester of the 1977-78 school year.
He was never specifically informed of that fact after his credit
for the spring semester had been established.10 Teare partici-
pated in the summer conditioning program and the official
practices when they began, and his performances indicated that
he would start on the varsity team. Prior to the first game he
was notified by the coach of his ineligibility." Teare brought
suit arguing that his exclusion from the team was a denial of
due process because he was not given advance warning of the
provisions of the rule, and because he was not given notice of his
loss of eligibility until it was too late for him to regain it; he
emphasized he could have done so by attending summer school
had he been informed of his ineligibility at the end of the spring
semester. 2 He did not challenge the preceding semester rule
itself.
The facts of Compagno established that Vincent Compagno
moved with his family to Omaha, Nebraska, about March 1,
1977, and enrolled at Creighton Preparatory High School, a
private parochial school, to complete his sophomore year. He
went out for the 1977 football team, but before the first game he
was informed that he was not eligible to participate in varsity
competition because of a Nebraska School Activities Associa-
tion ruling.'3
The ruling was based upon article I-R of the Association by-
laws. Section 4(b) of that article states:
If any student changes schools without an accompanying change of
residence on the part of parents. . . . the student shall be ineligible to
compete in athletics in the school of the place to which he/she has
9. Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 3-4.
13. Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip op.
at 1.
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moved until he/she has been in attendance at that school for a period
of one semester (90 school days).
1 4
Section 4(a) states: "Residence shall be defined as the place
where one has established his/her home, the place where the
student is habitually present, and to which, when departing, the
student intends to return."' 5
The residence rule in section 4(b) has been interpreted to
mean that no student may participate in athletics if the school
which he attends is in a different public school district than the
one in which his parents reside. 16 The Compagno family lived in
the Millard school district, while Creighton Prep, the school that
Compagno attended, is in School District 66. Although the offi-
cials of Creighton Prep were aware of both the rule and its
interpretation, Compagno was aware of neither until he was
informed of his ineligibility.
17
Compagno then brought suit alleging violations of his
constitutional rights protected by both the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 18
Teare and Compagno came before the court on motions for
preliminary injunctions. 19 The established standard for the is-
suance of a preliminary injunction requires the moving party to
show both a substantial probability of success at trial and an
irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued.20 Both motions
for preliminary injunctions were denied. Teare failed to show a
substantial probability of success on the merits of his claim;
21
while Compagno failed to show the probability of success on the
merits because of the insufficiency of the evidence produced.
22
III. DUE PROCESS
The common theme of Teare and Compagno is procedural
due process. Two issues were analyzed: whether a constitution-
14. NEBRASKA SCHOOL ACTIVITIES Ass'N, supra note 4, at 17. See Compagno v.
Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip op. at 1.
15. NEBRASKA SCHOOL ACTIVITIES Ass'N, supra note 4, at 16; Compagno v.
Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip op. at 2.
16. Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip op. at
2.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2, 5.
19. Id. at 2; Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 2. A temporary
restraining order had previously been entered in Teare. Id.
20. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388,392 (8th Cir.
1976).
21. Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 2, 6.
22. Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip op. at
4,6.
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ally protected interest was involved and, if such an interest was
at stake, whether the process due was provided.
Since the decisions in Teare and Compagno, the United
States Supreme Court has decided Board of Curators v.
Horowitz.23 Although Teare and Compagno probably would
have been decided the same, Horowitz is certain to have a
significant effect on any future due process analysis in which a
student's participation in an educational program is at issue.
A. The Interest Protected
In determining whether due process requirements apply, the
interest at stake must be examined to see if it is within the
protection of the due process clause.24 "The requirements of
procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of inter-
ests encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protec-
tion of liberty and property."
25
The question of whether participation in high school athlet-
ics involves interests protected by the fourteenth amendment
has been considered by a number of courts, both federal 26 and
state.27 The courts had consistently refused to extend fourteenth
23. 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978). Horowitz involved the academic dismissal of a student
from a university medical school. The Court assumed that a protected
interest was involved, and found that the procedures followed had suffi-
ciently met due process requirements. The school had fully informed the
student of the dissatisfaction with her progress and the possible conse-
quences, and the dismissal decision was made carefully and deliberately.
Id. at 952. The decision is significant in that it distinguishes between the
"far less stringent procedural requirements" for academic evaluations and
the due process requirements for disciplinary proceedings established in
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
24. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
25. Id. at 569.
26. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n., 552
F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976); Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976);
Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973);
Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.
1970); Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass'n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.
1963); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Walsh v.
Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 428 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. La. 1977);
Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976); Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F.
Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School Dist., 391
F. Supp. 358 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities
Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974); Moran v. School Dist. 07,
Yellowstone County, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972); Reed v. Nebraska
School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972); Paschal v. Perdue,
320 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of
Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
27. See, e.g., Beeson v. Kiowa County School Dist. RE-i, - Colo. App. -, 567
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amendment protections to participation in these activities, ex-
cept in instances in which racial discrimination was involved.
28
The federal courts had found no protected civil rights at stake
29
while the state courts had viewed such activities as privileges
subject to any reasonable regulation.
30
A new theme of litigation began to emerge in the early 1970's
as the rational basis test of the equal protection clause was
invoked to protect the rights of female
31 and married students32
against arbitrary discrimination which excluded them from
participation in high school athletics. Reed v. Nebraska School
Activities Association,33 which struck down a rule prohibiting
a female from playing on her school's only golf team, estab-
lished that the issue was not whether there was a right to partici-
pate in these activities, but rather whether there was a right for
females to be treated the same as males unless a rational basis
existed for treating them differently.
34
Reed was in the vanguard of a substantial number of equal
protection cases in which discriminatory rules were struck
down, not because athletic participation was in itself a constitu-
tionally protected interest, but because the classifications made
P.2d 801 (1977); Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974); Haas
v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515,289 N.E.2d 495 (1972);
Kentucky High School Athletic Ass'n v. Hopkins County Bd. of Educ., 552
S.W.2d 685 (Ky. App. 1977); Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic
Ass'n, 323 So. 2d 774 (La. 1975); Bruce v. South Carolina High School
League, 258 S.C. 546, 189 S.E.2d 817 (1972); Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass'n v. Cox, 221 Tenn. 164, 425 S.W.2d 597 (1968).
28. See, e.g., Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High
School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).
29. Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.
1970); Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass'n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.
1963). Contra, Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485
(M.D. Tenn. 1968). In Kelley, the court found that a one-year suspension of
a high school from interscholastic athletics involved a protected right or
interest of the students; however, this would no longer seem to be good law
in that circuit in view of Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass'n, 552 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976), in which it was found that participation
in athletics is not a protected interest.
30. See, e.g., Bruce v. South Carolina High School League, 258 S.C. 546, 189
S.E.2d 817 (1972); Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Cox, 221
Tenn. 164, 425 S.W.2d 597 (1968); Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227,
381 P.2d 718 (1963).
31. Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
32. Moran v. School Dist. -7, Yellowstone County, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont.
1972).
33. 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
34. Id. at 262. It should be noted that Reed was decided by Judge Urbom, the
same judge who heard Teare and Compagno.
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by state associations and schools were not rationally related to
the purpose of the particular rule being considered.3 5
Brenden v. Independent School District 742,36 following
what was essentially the Reed analysis,37 held that a rule pro-
hibiting females from participating with males in certain non-
contact sports on the school's only team violated the equal pro-
tection clause. Perhaps significantly, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals did conclude in Brenden that the "interest in partici-
pating in interscholastic sports is a substantial and cognizable
one."38 But Brenden did not reach the specific issue of whether
participation in high school athletics was of sufficient constitu-
tional interest to invoke the protections of the due process
clause. The three federal circuit courts of appeal which have
considered that specific issue have held that such participation
is not a constitutionally protected interest.39 This majority view
is clearly stated in Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association:
40
For better or worse, the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment does not insulate a citizen from every injury at the hands of the
state. "Only those rights, privileges and immunities that are secured
by the Constitution of the United States or some Act of Congress are
within the protection of the federal courts. Rights, privileges and
immunities not derived from the federal Constitution or secured
thereby are left exclusively to the protection of the States." The
privilege of participating in interscholastic athletics must be deemed
to fall in this latter category and outside the protection of due proc-
ess.41
At least one state appellate court has recently reached the
35. See, e.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1973); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Chabert v.
Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 323 So. 2d 774 (La. 1975).
36. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
37. Id. at 1297.
38. Id. at 1299.
39. 552 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976); Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976);
Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.
1970). In a recent decision involving the eligibility of college athletes, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide whether
there was a property interest in participation in intercollegiate basketball
or a liberty interest in players' good names, or both, sufficient to invoke the
guarantees of due process. Regents of U. of Minn. v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 560 F.2d 352, 366-67 (8th Cir. 1977). The court stated that
"[t]he correct resolution of this issue is uncertain, although we do note that
two courts of appeals have held that participation in school athletics is not
by itself a constitutionally protected property interest." Id. n.22.
40. 552 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976).
41. Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 552 F.2d 681, 682
(6th Cir. 1976) (quoting Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n,
430 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (5th Cir. 1970) (citation omitted)).
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same result.42 One tenth circuit district court, while citing the
Brenden reasoning to find a denial of equal protection, as well
as finding sex to be a suspect criteria requiring strict scrutiny,
nevertheless acknowledged that the law in the tenth circuit was
that the participation itself was not a protected interest.43
Teare and Compagno broke from this traditional position,
and recognized that participation in high school athletics in-
volves a liberty or property interest protected by due process. 44
The court noted the considerable support for the view that such
participation is a privilege unprotected by any constitutional
principle. But an analysis similar to Reed was used to reject the
right-privilege distinction, and the court noted Brenden as hav-
ing concluded that a student's interest in participation was sig-
nificant. However, the court in Teare and Compagno found
Board of Regents v. Roth45 and Goss v. Lopez 46 to be persua-
sive. Roth acknowledged that the fourteenth amendment's pro-
tection of property extends to those interests created and de-
fined by rules and understandings which stem from state law.4 7
Goss held that even a temporary suspension from public school
infringes on liberty and property interest protected by the due
process clause.48 The court in Teare and Compagno concluded
that participation in high school athletics is a significant part of
the program of public education provided by the State of Ne-
braska, and that in view of Roth and Goss, the applications of
the eligibility rules in these instances were likely to have im-
plicated a property or liberty interest protected by the four-
teenth amendment.49
42. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass'n v. Hopkins County Bd. of Educ., 552
S.W.2d 685 (Ky. App. 1977).
43. Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D.
Kan. 1974).
44. Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192 (D. Neb.
Sept. 16, 1977); Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190 (D. Neb. Sept. 16,
1977).
45. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
46. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
47. 408 U.S. at 577.
48. 419 U.S. at 574-75.
49. Compagno v. Nebraska State School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip
op. at 3; Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 4.
Compare Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-
192 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 1977) and Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190 (D.
Neb. Sept. 16, 1977) with Braesch v. DePasquale, 200 Neb. 726,- N.W.2d -
(1978). In Braesch, the Nebraska Supreme Court was confronted with this
issue in an appeal from a state district court which had specifically found
that the right to participate in interscholastic basketball was protected by
the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions. The analysis
of this question was approached almost exactly as it had been by the
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Though Roth and Goss were of special significance to the
court, it would seem that this extension of due process protec-
tion was to some extent made possible by building upon the
foundation which was established in Reed and which was furth-
er developed in Brenden, even though both were decided on
equal protection grounds. Perhaps some of those very interests
which were distinguished to make Reed possible have since
been developed so that Teare and Compagno could merge those
interests with the interests recognized in Roth and Goss to
significantly extend due process protections to specific aspects
of a student's total education program.
5°
The implicit issue of access to as contrasted with removal
from an educational program or activity may be noted at this
point. Although alluded to in Compagno in the context of the
process due, the question of whether a protected interest exists
prior to actual entry into the activity was never specifically
confronted; however, these two decisions imply an affirmative
answer.
The extensions of due process protections in Teare and
Compagno seem to flow logically from the implications of Goss.
Goss established that a student's entitlement to a public educa-
tion was a property interest protected by the due process clause,
and reaffirmed the view that beyond a de minimus deprivation
of that interest, the gravity of the deprivation is irrelevant to
whether due process must be considered.51 The Supreme Court
federal district court in Teare and Compagno, with the exception that the
supreme court stated that "[plarticipation in interscholastic athletics ordi-
narily has significantly less important constitutional dimensions than does
participation in traditional academic education." 200 Neb. at 731,-N.W.2d
at-. The state district court's finding on the issue was neither affirmed nor
reversed; the supreme court went on to consider what process was due
under the circumstances, assuming that the application of the rule in-
volved implicated a protected property or liberty interest. Id. at 730-32, -
N.W.2d at -. But see Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School Dist., 391 F.
Supp. 358 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (the implications of Goss were considered, but it
was determined that the protected interest was participation in the entire
process of education, not in just a single activity such as athletics).
See also Yellow Springs Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High School Athletic
Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (association rule excluding girls
from participating in contact sports by playing on boy's teams found to
deprive girls of a liberty interest without due process of law); Reisdorff v.
Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-0-3 (D. Neb. Jan. 20, 1977) (as a
matter of substantive due process, student cannot be arbitrarily or capri-
ciously excluded from participating in an athletic program).
50. Judge Urbom also decided Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D.
Neb. 1972), a significant due process decision which established procedural
safeguards when a student's expulsion is being considered.
51. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-76 (1975).
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has emphasized that in deciding whether due process require-
ments apply, the determining factor is not the weight but the
nature of the interest at stake.52 Although the academic-discipli-
nary distinction of Horowitz could be read with this to infer
that eligibility for an activity might not be a protected interest,
Horowitz appeared to acknowledge that such interests do exist,
but that only minimal due process is required for an academic
determination.
53
An extracurricular activity would seem to be of no greater
significance to a student than would any academic or vocational
course. If Teare and Compagno recognize an interest sufficient
for the invocation of due process protection in athletic partici-
pation, then there should be an interest of comparable impor-
tance in having access to and remaining in those particular
courses, activities, and programs which a student believes to be
of special personal value. However, the impact of such a selec-
tive application of due process to student qualification and
placement in special programs and services would be tempered
by the minimal procedures apparently allowed by Horowitz in
academic situations. These decisions do indicate that school
officials who may have to decide to deny a student admittance
to or suspend or exclude a student from any class or activity
should provide at least minimal due process, such as making the
rules of admittance or removal available to students.
B. The Process Due
Having determined that interests protected by the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment were implicated, the
court turned to the question of what process was due under the
circumstances in each case. The Supreme Court's acknowledg-
ment of the flexible nature of due process 54 and the summary of
relevant due process considerations given in Mathews v. El-
dridge55 were noted:
[Ojur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dic-
tates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
56
52. Id. at 575.
53. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948, 952 (1978).
54. See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
55. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
56. Id. at 334-35.
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The specific procedural safeguard involved in both Teare
and Compagno was advance notice of the terms of the applica-
ble eligibility rule. "[A] reasonably accessible means of becom-
ing aware of the applicable rule is an essential element of due
process. ' 57 The court further declared that "[o]ne of the funda-
mental requirements of fairness implicit within due process is
'warning ... in language that the common world will under-
stand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.' ",58
With these dictates of due process as guides, the circum-
stances of each case were considered. The relative respon-
sibilities of the student and the school or association were re-
garded as determinative.
Teare argued that the advance notice of the rule that he
received-publication in and distribution of the student hand-
book-was inadequate. 59 The court rejected this argument,
concluding that Teare was on notice of the existence of eligibili-
ty requirements and had reason to know of the student hand-
book and of its uses. "Through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence in protecting his own interests, he could have readily
learned the terms of the eligibility rules.
'60
Teare's argument that due process required the school to
give him notice at the time the contingency which resulted in his
ineligibility occurred was also rejected. 61 The ,court believed
that the three-factor analysis of Mathews counseled against
imposing that additional burden on the school officials. First,
although the private interest involved was significant, it was not
a critical one entitled to the scrupulous protections afforded
more precious interests. Second, since the operation of the pre-
vious semester rule was one of eligibility rather than discipline,
and since the rule could have been applied by easy reference to
objective criteria, the additional safeguard would have been of
limited value; furthermore, if Teare would have made the effort
to inform himself, he would have had no need of further notifi-
cation by the school of his ineligibility. Third, "a requirement
that a school or athletic association notify each student every
time an eligibility rule threatens adverse consequences does
impose significant administrative burdens. '62 Because the lim-
57. Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip op. at
3; Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 5.
58. Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 501 F.2d 25, 29 (8th Cir. 1974) (quoting
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
59. Teare v. Board of Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 3.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id. at 5-6.
62. Id. at 6.
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its of such a rule would be difficult to predict, a school should
not be obligated by due process to warn a student whenever a
rule or requirement might adversely affect an educational inter-
est.
63
The Teare analysis can be summarized as follows: (1) an
advance notice of an activity eligibility rule by way of a student
handbook is probably sufficient; and (2) a balancing of the stu-
dent's responsibility with the school's administrative burden
indicates that due process does not require a school to notify a
student every time the student's conduct results in a threat to
that student's own interests.
Compagno's due process claim was analyzed in essentially
the same manner as Teare's, although the facts were signifi-
cantly different. 64 In Compagno no written eligibility rule was
placed in the possession of the student until after his ineligibility
was established; furthermore, the written rule was vague, and
an ordinarily perceptive student was unlikely to interpret it as
requiring the parents to reside in the public school district in
which the parochial school being attended is located. Neverthe-
less, it was determined that there was no denial of due process,
at least under the evidence presented.
65
The rule confronted was "a rule of eligibility in a voluntary
activity" 66 and was applied to one not previously eligible; no
"eligibility or other expectation of participation which he had
acquired by previous participation" was being denied.67 To have
been useful, the accepted interpretation of the residency rule
would have had to have been known to Compagno before his
family moved to Omaha or before he enrolled in school.
As a practical matter, it would have been virtually impossible for the
association to have given him notice of the rule before both these acts
occurred. Under these conditions, the initial burden of attempting to
learn of rules of eligibility lay upon the student, rather than upon the
school or the association.6 8
If Compagno had attempted to learn of the rules, the inquiry
probably would have resulted in his receiving either the written
rule itself or an interpretation of the rule; under the evidence
presented it was wholly speculative which he would have re-
ceived. What was significant was the absence of any evidence to
63. Id.
64. Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip op. at
2-3.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3-4.
68. Id. at 4.
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show that Compagno had made any attempt to learn of the rules
before establishing residence and enrolling in school or whether
such an attempt would have obtained the association's interpre-
tation.
69
The issue of the vagueness of the rule was never specifically
reached; however, had an attempt been made to obtain the
information, Compagno could have claimed that he had met his
burden, but that the school and the association had not met
theirs.
If a full and accurate interpretation would not have been received
upon reasonable inquiry, futility of the attempt would be established.
On the other hand, if a full and accurate interpretation would have
been given upon a reasonable inquiry, the failure to inquire, not the
vagueness of the rule, was the cause of Vincent's ineligibility.
7 0
Compagno indicates that the initial burden to learn of any
residence requirements is on the student seeking to participate
for the first time in a voluntary extracurricular activity, pro-
vided that the rules are reasonably accessible. Accessibility can
depend upon whether the actual meaning is likely to be ob-
tained upon inquiry of a convenient source.
The analysis of notice requirements in Teare and Compagno
would appear to comport with that in Regents of University of
Minnesota v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,71 in
which the application of eligibility'rules to college.athletics was
considered by the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit:
[T]he Association rules under which the student-athletes were charg-
ed do not by their own terms require any actual knowledge of the
infraction. In this, there is no constitutional infirmity. Although due
process does require that lawful punitive action can only be imposed
where fair notice has been given .... there is no general requirement,
even in criminal cases, that the charged party actually knew at the
time of the offense or infraction that the conduct was proscribed.
7 2
It might be concluded from these decisions that although the
eligibility rules must be made reasonably accessible, the stu-
dent-athlete has the responsibility to learn of them.73 Further-
69. Id.
70. Id. n.3.
71. 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977).
72. Id. at 369.
73. A state appellate court came to this same conclusion in a recent eligibility
case. Dumez v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 334 So. 2d 494 (La.
App. 1976) (writ refused). The court determined that the placement of
posters displaying eligibility rules in prominent locations about the school
satisfied the due process requirement of reasonable notice, and that it was
not necessary that a rule book be furnished each student. However, the
court did state that "it is essential that they do advise students of a rule
where the violation of that rule imposes a penalty and if the manner of
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more, even if the student does not know of the rules, that fact in
itself does not invoke the protection of the due process clause to
prohibit the operation of the rules.
The analysis of the process due in Teare and Compagno is
appropriate in view of Goss v. Lopez.74 The opinion of the Court
in Goss emphasized a sense of fundamental fairness and the
need for due process protections in student disciplinary suspen-
sions.7 5 The Goss dissent expressed concern with both the extra
burden due process considerations would place on school offi-
cials and the detrimental effect of such procedures on the essen-
tial inculcation in each pupil of an understanding of the need for
rules and adherence thereto.
76
Although the actual analysis seems to follow the flexible
three-factor balancing approach to due process, as did Teare
and Compagno, Board of Curators v. Horowitz7 7 emphasized
the distinctions between disciplinary proceedings and
academnic evaluations in determining what process is due.78
Disciplinary decisions, such as in Goss, involve disputed issues
of fact and some form of hearing is a protection against error;
academic judgments are more subjective and evaluative, and
therefore less reliant on factual determinations. Furthermore,
the educational process is centered on a continuing student-
teacher relationship, and this relationship might be harmed if
academic evaluations were subject to the type of hearing that
the adversary nature of a disciplinary suspension requires.
79
It should be noted that neither Teare nor Compagno in-
volved a hearing.80 Notice and an opportunity to be heard are
notice is through a poster, then it behooves the student athlete to inform
himself accordingly." Id. at 502.
74. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
75. Id. at 580-81.
76. Id. at 584.
77. 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
78. Id. at 952-55.
79. Id. at 955.
80. The Nebraska School Activities Association has a due process procedure
for notice, hearing, and review to be followed in the event of an alleged
infraction of the association's constitution, by-laws, or approved rulings.
See NEBRASKA SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASS'N, supra note 4, at 12-13. Since there
was no alleged infraction, this procedure was not used. Article VI, section
1(6) of the constitution of the association provides that "the Board of
Control shall have the authority to set aside the effect of any eligibility rule
upon an individual student when in its opinion the rule fails to accomplish
the purpose for which it is intended, or when the rule works an undue
hardship upon the student." Id. at 10. Both Teare and Compagno did make
application for a hardship exception ruling. Teare's application was denied
by the Board of Control; Compagno's application had not yet been con-
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fundamental requisites of due process when "[t]he student's
interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educa-
tional process, with all its unfortunate consequences."8 1 It can
and probably should be inferred that if a declaration of ineligi-
bility is contemplated which would rest on a contested factual is-
sue, then a due process hearing which would meet at least the
minimal standards if not the "more formal procedures" of Goss
should be provided.8 2 However, this may be necessary only in
the context of discipline; if the question of eligibility can be
categorized as an academic determination, then even if disputed
factual issues are involved, Horowitz implies that no hearing is
necessary.
83
The academic-disciplinary distinction made in Horowitz,
though seemingly a definitive starting point for an analysis of
what process is due, may be extremely difficult to apply in
many situations. One of the purposes of education is to teach
appropriate conduct and discipline is often used to promote
good study habits and academic achievement.
How should the question of eligibility for athletic participa-
tion, such as in Teare and Compagno, be classified? Although
Teare rather clearly ran afoul of an academic standard, is the
operation of the previous semester rule intended to provide
more time and attention for academic pursuits, or is it punish-
ment intended to discourage poor study habits? What of the
student who fails to meet a school's standard of "good citizen-
ship" as a prerequisite to participation? 84 The residency rule
that Compagno unknowingly violated would seem to have as its
purpose the prevention of athletic recruitment in the secondary
schools. Does this involve an educational issue of regulating
participation in activities, or is it a punitive measure intended to
discourage a form of misconduct on the part of either a school
or a student? Does the fact that the adversary is a state activities
association rather than the student's school negate the concern
of the court for preserving the normal student-teacher relation-
ship? Such questions do not lend themselves to categorical an-
sidered at the time of the district court's decision. Compagno v. Nebraska
School Activities Ass'n, No. CV77-L-192, slip op. at 2; Teare v. Board of
Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 3. The use of this hardship exception
procedure would be a step toward compliance with the limited due process
standard that Horowitz requires in the academic evaluation context.
81. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
82. Id. at 584.
83. 98 S. Ct. at 952-55.
84. Such a provision was in the handbook given Teare. Teare v. Board of
Educ., No. CV77-L-190, slip op. at 2.
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swers. Educational issues involving elements of both discipline
and academics are common.
Perhaps Horowitz can be of most value if read to emphasize
the distinction between the more objective factual decisions
often associated with discipline and the more subjective
comparative determinations common to academic evaluations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Teare and Compagno significantly extend due process pro-
tections. First of all, this fourteenth amendment protection is
extended to participation in athletics, which has not been con-
sidered a constitutionally protected interest. Secondly, due
process is extended to a voluntary and extracurricular activity
which is only a single part of the total program of education.
Finally, they imply that the interest in having access to an edu-
cational program or activity is sufficient to invoke the protec-
tion of the due process clause.
It is equally significant that Teare and Compagno place a
substantial burden upon the student to protect his or her own
interests by assuming the responsibility for knowing of and
understanding the rules established and promulgated by the
school. The school has a comparable responsibility under pro-
cedural due process to make its rules reasonably accessible and
understandable. Publication in a student handbook is appropri-
ate notice of regulations.
The flexible three-factor due process analysis in Teare and
Compagno considered the significance of the interests, the
chance of error, and the burden of responsibilities in a fair and
reasonable manner-and that would seem to be the essence of
due process.
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